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Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
A few years ago, my grown-up children convinced me to join 
Facebook and Twitter to prove that I was not completely out-
dated, socially speaking. I posted one of my very few tweets 
on 2 May 2012, on the 20th anniversary of my signing, on 
behalf of Norway, the EEA Agreement in Oporto. In no uncer-
tain terms I praised the positive effects of the Agreement. To 
that tweet I received no reactions whatsoever, whether posi-
tive or negative.
There are at least two possible explanations for that lack of 
response. First, the EEA is like the weather. You cannot do 
much about it, whether you like it or not. Second, even more 
seriously, the Twitter public, or at least most of them, do not 
have a clue about the most far-reaching agreement Norway 
ever signed, as regards domestic and foreign policy.
Norway certainly is a European state. But we look peculiar 
in the eyes of many. What other European nations have been 
begging for, Norway has turned down twice, against the will 
of two governments that had parliamentary majorities. 
Norwegian foreign policy can be understood only in a histori-
cal context. We are a young nation-state. Full independence 
was refused in 1814, since it did not fit with the European 
architecture of the time. Our first foreign minister after inde-
pendence in 1905, Jørgen Løvland, told the parliament that 
he deemed it of paramount importance for Norway to stay 
away from what he, not very diplomatically, described as the 
war-mongering states of Europe. At the same time, Norway 
pursued extensive trade and shipping interests, in Europe 
and globally.
Policy recommendations:
• The global geopolitical situation is changing, with 
a growing role for China, India and others whose 
investments are seen also in Norway. Europe and the 
European states are credible partners in the pursuit of 
mutually reinforcing interests.
• The political events and social and ethnic tensions in 
our near surroundings call for strong European efforts 
to aid and assist in economic development, welfare 
and the lessening of tensions. Norway is definitely a 
European player.
• The pressing issues of climate change and energy cre-
ate various venues for Norway and the EU. Our climate 
policy positions are close – and Norway’s energy posi-
tion is favourable. This means we can act together.
• The Norwegian tax payer is already contributing more 
to European regional development than the average 
European citizen. This should not be seen as an entry 
fee to the European market, but as an investment in a 
more prosperous and regionally balanced Europe, to our 
own benefit as well.
• Norway should strengthen its efforts to take part in the 
decisions that shape the EU/EEA-processes.
• If we want equal democratic rights for Norway, only full 
EU membership will suffice.
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It took two world wars to change Norway’s one-sided neu-
tralist, trade-oriented perception of national needs. Neutral-
ity did not keep us unscathed in the First World War; many 
Norwegian sailors lost their lives. Norway came out in strong 
support of the League of Nations, of international law, arbi-
tration, humanitarian work and conflict resolution, in the 
spirit of Fridtjof Nansen. These efforts were not enough to 
hinder the Second World War. Eventually, Norway became a 
founding member of both the United Nations and NATO, with 
strong security guarantees. 
My colleague at the Institute for Defense Studies, Professor 
Olav Riste, describes this development as the three formative 
phases of Norwegian foreign policy: the neutralist phase up 
to the First World War, then the missionary phase, and finally 
the alliance phase after the Second World War. Features from 
these formative phases are predominant in almost all foreign 
policy discussions in Norway. The anti-EU slogan from 1972 
and 1994, ‘Nei til salg av Norge’ (‘No to the sale of Norway’) 
certainly has its roots in the neutralist phase. 
We might have expected a fourth formative phase in Norwe-
gian foreign policy in the 1990s or after the EU enlargement 
to Central and Eastern Europe. The Single Market, the fall of 
the Berlin Wall and the broadening and deepening of the EU 
have opened new opportunities. They represent geopolitical 
events of the first order. 
Norway grasped only the first opportunity, the Single Market, 
since securing market access and a level playing field with 
Sweden, Germany and Spain was obviously in the national 
interest. To avoid new borders with our Nordic neighbours, 
with whom we have had a passport union since the 1950s, 
we opted for Schengen participation. We tend to go for the 
obvious, while reserving our political rights if we are inse-
cure or even hostile, leaving the issue of EU membership to 
the future. The EEA institutions, a remarkable invention of 
then-Commission President Jacques Delors and others, must 
be understood as a political project for building bridges to 
the cautious seven EFTA free-traders. Those institutions lost 
considerable impact when Sweden, Finland and Austria 
surprisingly went in for rapid EU membership, and the Swiss 
even dropped the EEA project.
The government of Gro Harlem Brundtland felt we had no 
better option than to follow our Nordic neighbours – with 
the known negative result in the 1994 referendum. Was EU 
membership envisaged as the sole logical conclusion of the 
EEA? Not entirely, and not at that stage. The EEA enjoyed the 
strong support of many nay-sayers to the EU – in the trade 
unions, in the Labour Party, in the Christian People’s Party 
and the Liberal Party. If the original EEA concept worked for 
some years, that could make it more natural to go for mem-
bership – or settle for a final no. This process was aborted by 
events.
After that referendum I was sent by the prime minister to 
explain the Norwegian position to colleagues in Paris, Lon-
don and Berlin – not exactly a triumphant journey. Foreign 
minister Alain Juppe politely regretted the results, and 
wished Norway all the best. Douglas Hurd was deeply sym-
pathetic and understanding: after all, many in Britain held 
similarly reserved feelings toward the EU. But Klaus Kinkel in 
Bonn was fuming. ‘Bjørn Tore, what is the matter with you? 
By now I’m on a first-name basis with every Norwegian fish 
– and then you say no!’ More than any of the others, he and 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl had supported Norway in the tough 
negotiations, and the disappointment was correspondingly 
great. Norway really belongs to the German concept of a 
European Union.
Even with the 52 per cent ‘no’ vote of 1994, the past 20 years 
have shown that the Norwegian authorities neither can nor 
wish to isolate Norway from the increasingly close and bind-
ing integration processes in the EU, as explained in detail in 
the Report of the EEA Review Committee, submitted in Janu-
ary 2012. 
The democratic deficit implicit here is well known, but the 
political chemistry of Norway seems to go against change in 
the foreseeable future – perhaps this democratic deficit is not 
so painful after all. European common sense in most political 
issues corresponds to the attitudes and opinions of the aver-
age Norwegian. New EU agreements or legislation entailing 
significant new obligations for Norway number a full 287 
items for the years 1992–2011. Of these, 265 were adopted 
unanimously, and the remainder were generally supported 
by a broad majority.
The fact that the broader political development of the EU has 
been remarkable when it comes to environment and resource 
issues, regional policies, social responsibility and govern-
ance has eased the impression that Norway and the EU have 
different priorities and agendas. We are not ‘annerledeslan-
det’, –  the other, very different country: Norway is part of a 
European development.
By far the biggest challenge as I see it is the lack of awareness 
of the importance of our own relations to the EU. Norway’s 
political parties, particularly on the yes-side, seem relieved 
that fierce new confrontations can be avoided, while at the 
same time forgetting their responsibility to raise important 
issues or create greater awareness of our daily relations 
with the EU. With some exceptions, the media seem gener-
ally provincial, with little European focus. Our educational 
institutions have not caught up, and textbooks are weak on 
modern Europe. By the end of this anniversary year, Norwe-
gian pupils will know more about the year 1814 than about 
the EEA – in fact, they probably did already.
3I have been asked to comment on the future and I shall try to 
touch briefly on a few points.
First, the geopolitical situation is changing, with a growing 
role for China, India and others. Their investments, students 
and labour are seen globally, also in Norway. Europe and 
the European states are credible partners in the pursuit of 
mutually reinforcing interests. A strong EU will boost such 
a development.
Second, political events and social and ethnic tensions in our 
near surroundings call for strong European efforts to aid and 
assist in economic development, welfare and lessening of 
tensions. Coordinating foreign and security policies in the EU 
has never been easy, since the nation-state is a strong factor 
in major EU member countries. The Ukraine has shown a will 
to act together that can only be applauded. Norway finds it 
easy to align itself with EU foreign policy, and our resources 
and political willpower are needed. We are definitely a Euro-
pean player.
Thirdly, the pressing issues of climate and energy create 
various possible venues for Norway and the EU. Our climate 
policy positions are close – and our energy position is favour-
able. We can act together.
Fourth, because of Norway’s advantageous resource posi-
tion, the Norwegian tax payer is already contributing more to 
European regional development than the average European 
citizen. This should not be seen as an entry fee to the Euro-
pean market, but as an investment in a more prosperous and 
regionally balanced Europe, to our own benefit as well. Inci-
dentally, it would not be totally improper to raise the issue 
of whether Norway should be allowed to process more of its 
own regional resources, notably in fisheries, with full Euro-
pean market access, so as to further strengthen our ability to 
contribute to future regional obligations.
Fifth, Norway should strengthen its efforts to take part in the 
decisions that shape the EU/EEA-processes. Important issues 
of principle should be introduced prior to decisions in the 
EU – not afterwards. Norwegian ministers should appear in 
person in Brussels on all possible occasions, instead of send-
ing their civil servants.
Finally, could Norwegian membership in the EU ever mate-
rialize? I dislike letting others taking decision on my behalf. 
I felt this particularly strongly when I observed it from the 
angle of Norwegian ambassador to Germany, in 2003–2007. 
I saw the many important contributions we could make and 
the ease with which Norwegian ministers manoeuvred in 
Berlin. 
My principal logical conclusion is this: only full EU member-
ship will do if we want equal democratic rights for Norway. 
But not to raise unfounded expectations, let me round off 
with a true story from one of my open-air street meetings 
on Oslo’s Karl Johan Street in September 1994. Speaking to 
a sizeable gathering of people on the pavement, I argued, 
among other things, for the efficiency and practicality of 
being able to attend EU ministerials twice a month to take 
care of national interests, rather than trying to rally all EU 
member-state capitals bilaterally as a non-member. A quick 
young man grasped a microphone and delivered the final 
blow: “Minister, you may have a point there, but this is your 
problem, not ours!” 
Or: As long as it is seen as more important to form viable gov-
ernment coalitions than entering into the daring project of 
a possible ‘yes’ in a new referendum, a new EU campaign is 
unlikely to occur in Norway.
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